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Abstract
Donaldson, Gromb and Piacentino (2019) suggest that, in the presence of limited
commitment, increasing the fraction of a firm’s cash flows that can be pledged as
collateral might make the firm worse off. We show that, in fact, firms can never
be hurt by increased pledgeability of cash flows in their framework. We then show
that the first best can always be implemented by non-state contingent collateralized
debt contracts that differ from the ones they consider.
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Donaldson, Gromb and Piacentino (2019) (henceforth DGP) develop a dynamic model
in which collateral (i) provides property rights that accrue to a secured creditor upon
default, and (ii) gives an initial creditor the right of exclusion, preventing a subsequent
creditor from seizing the collateral. DGP make the point that an initial creditor must
rely on collateral to secure its claims when enough assets can be pledged as collateral.
This is because if the initial creditor does not collateralize at least partially, it is too easy
for a future borrower to fund new (possibly negative NPV) projects using collateralized
credit that dilutes the claims of the initial creditor.
DGP identify what they term an inefficient collateral rat race that ensues when only
a fraction of the firm’s assets can be pledged as collateral. In this case, they argue that
the demand for collateral from the initial creditors can be so high that it encumbers the
assets, creating a collateral overhang that may inefficiently constrain future borrowing
and investments. Their abstract highlights that: “Our results suggest that policies aimed
at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire, triggering an inefficient collateral rat
race.” They also provide a motivating example in which they discuss two scenarios: a
low-pledgeability case, in which the first best is implemented, and a high pledgeability
case in which—supposedly—it is not. This suggests that, paradoxically, increasing the
share of cash flows that a firm can pledge as collateral can make it worse off.
Our paper shows that, in fact, firms can never be hurt by having access to more
pledgeable cash flows in DGP’s setting. The result is intuitive, it extends beyond their
two-state setting, and its validity does not require any of their parametric assumptions.
To see the logic, consider the effect of a positive shock to a firm’s pledgeable assets.
Regardless of whether the firm was investing efficiently before, in the absence of infor-
mational asymmetries, having access to more collateral has an option value that cannot
hurt. The firm can always fully offset the shock by issuing more secured debt at the
outset, so as to keep the amount of collateral available for future investments constant,
in which case the allocation implemented will be the same as before. Moreover, the firm
might do better, if the availability of collateral previously constrained investment.
We complete our analysis by showing that alternative (non-state-contingent) collat-
eral contracts can implement the first best for all parameter values. Our findings suggest
that future investigations of the conditions under which pledgeability might hurt a firm
should explicitly consider informational asymmetries between the firm and its investors.
In an extension, DGP relax the equivalence between pledgeable and collateralizable
assets assumed in their core model. Specifically, Section 4.7 assumes that a fraction of
pledgeable assets cannot be used as collateral. DGP then argue that high collateralizabil-
ity may be associated with underinvestment. In Appendix 1 we show that this requires the
cash flows of negative NPV projects to be more collateralizable than those of positive NPV
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ones. If the fraction of cash flows that is collateralizable is project-independent—as is
assumed to hold for pledgeability—then increased collateralizability can only help a firm.
The motivating example. To provide intuition, DGP first give an example in which a
firm requires external debt finance to pursue investment projects at dates 0 and 1, where
the date 0 project has a positive NPV, but the date 1 project has a negative NPV. They
show that when the fraction θ of cash flows that can be pledged is low then unsecured
debt can be used to finance the positive NPV date 0 project, as it does not leave enough
pledgeable assets to fund the negative NPV date 1 project.
In this example, the positive NPV date 0 project costs 200, and pays 600 at date 2.
The negative NPV date 1 project costs 500, and pays 400 at date 2. When pledgeability
is low (e.g., θ = 2
5
) the date 0 project can be funded with unsecured debt without being
concerned that the date 1 project will be undertaken, because there is not enough total
pledgeable cash flow to cover its cost: 2
5
(600+400) = 400 < 500. When pledgeability rises
to θ = 1
2
, the date 0 project must be financed using some secured debt, as now the total
pledgeable cash flow covers the cost of the date 1 project: 1
2
(600+400) = 500. As a result,
a date-1 creditor C1 would be willing to lend if the date 0 project were funded with unse-
cured debt. However, DGP observe that if at date 0 the firm issued fully secured debt—
i.e., debt fully backed by collateral—then at date 1 the inefficient investment is prevented.
Because the date 0 debt is riskless, competition in the credit market pushes its face value
to 200. Thus, debt can be backed by σ = 2
3
of project 0’s pledgeable cash flow, as 2
3
1
2
600 =
200. Once the date-0 creditor C0 has priority, a date-1 creditor C1 is unwilling to lend.
DGP then ask, “But what if project 1 were unexpectedly good, with payoff 550?” This
payoff exceeds its 500 cost—can it be financed? The answer is that, when θ = 1
2
and
σ = 2
3
, there is not enough pledgeable cash flow net the repayment to a date-1 creditor
to cover its cost: 1
2
(600 + 550)− 200 = 375 < 500. By fully collateralizing project 0, the
borrower cannot pledge enough to finance its positive NPV project at date 1. That is, the
collateral overhang results in an inefficient outcome. As DGP put it: “By collateralizing
its debt to C0, [the Borrower] B has encumbered its assets and cannot pledge enough to
C1 to finance a positive NPV project. There is a collateral overhang.”
This presentation suggests that inefficient investment might be an equilibrium out-
come. In fact, it is not. Full collateralization of σ = 2
3
of the pledgeable cash flows from
project 0 is not needed to discourage a date 1 lender from funding the negative NPV
project. Indeed, securing any fraction σ′ ∈ (0, 1
4
] achieves the optimum: (i) it prevents
investment if the date 1 project has a negative NPV, because 1
2
((1−σ′)600 + 400) < 500;
and (ii) it enables investment if the date 1 project has a positive NPV, because 1
2
((1 −
σ′)600 + 550) ≥ 500. As a result, the collateral rat race has no effect on efficiency in this
2
example; in equilibrium, a higher rate of pledgeability θ does not make the firm worse off.
This result reflects that the conditions for an inefficient outcome (see DGP’s Corollary
2 ) are not satisfied in the example.1 So, in this example a paradox in which increasing
pledgeability hurts a firm does not arise. Our paper shows that it never does.
Setup. There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) and one consumption good dubbed cash. A
borrower B has no cash but has access to two investment projects: one at t = 0 and one
at t = 1. The date 0 project requires investment I0 > 0 at t = 0 to generate X0 for sure
at t = 2. At date 1, a state s ∈ {H,L} realizes, where p := Pr[s = H] is the probability of
a high state. In state s, B can invest in a project that requires borrowing Is1 and delivers
Xs1 for sure at date 2. The state L project has a negative NPV and is inefficient to fund,
while the state H project has a positive NPV and is efficient to fund.
B can raise financing from a competitive credit market at each date. In particular,
B can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a set of competitive financiers at dates t = 0, 1.
There is no discounting, all agents are risk neutral, they consume only at date 2 and there
are no informational asymmetries at any date. The final cash flow is X := i0X0 + i
s
1X
s
1 ,
for i0 ∈ {0, 1} and is1 ∈ {0, 1}. Here, i0 = 0 means that there is no investment at date 0,
and is1 = 0 means that there is no investment at date 1 in state s.
There are two frictions. First, a fraction 1− θ of the final cash flow X is not pledge-
able. That is, B can always divert this fraction of the final project payoffs. Second, at
date 0, B cannot credibly constrain its future investment and financing actions—a form
of limited commitment that DGP term ‘non-exclusivity’.
In addition, DGP exogenously constrain the set of admissible contracts. Specifically,
DGP assume that if a security is backed by a fraction σ of the pledgeable cash flow θX,
so that the value of the collateral is σθX, then that fraction σ cannot depend on the
state of the world s, even though this state is observable and verifiable by all parties ex
post. When σ = 1, all pledgeable cash flows θX are used as collateral.
Assumptions. DGP impose five restrictions on model parameters:
A1. Project 0’s pledgeable payoff in state L alone exceeds its investment cost: I0 <
(1− p)θX0, which implies that I0 < X0. Thus, a creditor is willing to lend at date
0 if she anticipates no dilution in state L.
1A necessary condition detailed in the corollary for an inefficient outcome is that the investment
required by the positive NPV date 1 project (i.e., 500) must exceed that required by the negative NPV
date 1 project (also 500) plus θ times the difference in the two projects’ cash flows 550 − 400 = 150.
Thus, for an inefficient outcome to arise, one needs 500 ≥ 500 + θ150, which is violated by all θ > 0.
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A2. Project 1’s NPV is positive in state H but not in state L: XH1 −IH1 > 0 > XL1 −IL1 .
A3. The pledgeable cash flow fails to cover the investment needed at date 1 in all states:
θ(X0 +X
s
1) < I0 + I
s
1 , ∀s. Thus, B may be unable to fund Project 1 in state H.
A4. Project 1’s non-pledgeable payoff is not too small: (1− θ)XL1 > θX0− I0. Thus, B
has an incentive to undertake Project 1 even in the negative NPV state L.
A5. Project 1’s cost is not too high: IH1 < θ(X0 + X
H
1 ). That is, there is enough
pledgeable total cash to fund Project 1 in the positive NPV state H.
DGP then observe that for a collateral rat race to result in a collateral overhang—that
is, an inefficient outcome—two further conditions need to be met:
A6. The pledgeable cash flows are high enough to fund Project 1 in the negative NPV
state L: θ ≥ θ∗ := IL1
X0+XL1
. Thus, a date-0 creditor is not willing to lend unsecured.
A7. Project 1’s cost in state H is large enough: IH1 ≥ I∗1 (θ) := IL1 + θ(XH1 −XL1 ). Thus,
the date 0 collateralization demand makes financing Project 1 in state H impossible.
Two preliminary results. A2 asserts that the project has positive a NPV in state H,
but a negative NPV in state L, making the problem interesting. Lemma 1 shows that if A2
holds, then A7 can be satisfied by some θ only if XH1 > X
L
1 , which we henceforth assume.
Lemma 1. If XH1 ≤ XL1 , then A7 and A2 do not simultaneously hold for any θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. If XH1 < X
L
1 , then I
H
1 ≥ I∗1 ⇐⇒ θ ≥ I
L
1 −IH1
XL1 −XH1
. The condition can be satisfied by
some θ ∈ [0, 1] only if IL1 −IH1
XL1 −XH1
≤ 1, or, equivalently only if IL1 −XL1 ≤ IH1 −XH1 . However,
from A2, IL1 −XL1 > 0 > IH1 −XH1 , which yields a contradiction. Finally, ifXH1 = XL1 = X1
then A7 reads IH1 ≥ IL1 . However, A2 requires IH1 < X1 < IL1 , a contradiction.
By Lemma 1, A7 can be rewritten as an upper bound on pledgeability θ required for
a collateral overhang (i.e., an inefficient outcome) to arise:
A7′. θ ≤ θˆ := IH1 −IL1
XH1 −XL1
.
We next show that Assumptions A1, A3, A4, and A5 can be rewritten as representing
an upper and a lower bound on the set of feasible pledgeability levels θ:
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Lemma 2. Conditions A1, A3, A4 and A5 can be rewritten compactly as θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), where
θ := max
{
I0
(1− p)X0 ,
IH1
X0 +XH1
}
> 0 and θ¯ := min
{
I0 + I
H
1
X0 +XH1
,
I0 +X
L
1
X0 +XL1
}
< 1.
(1)
Proof. From A2, XL1 < I
L
1 , so A4 implies that A3 never binds in state s = L. We then
rewrite A1 as θ > I0
(1−p)X0 , A3 as θ <
I0+IH1
X0+XH1
, A4 as θ <
I0+XL1
X0+XL1
and A5 as θ >
IH1
X0+XH1
.
That θ > 0 and θ¯ < 1 follows immediately from A1-A5.
Equilibrium allocation and implementation. DGP summarize the equilibrium out-
comes and their implementation using secured and unsecured debt in Corollary 2 :
Corollary 2 (DGP). The equilibrium outcome is as follows.
If θ < θ∗, the first best is attained. At Date 0, B borrows unsecured. At
Date 1, B borrows secured in state H and does not borrow in state L.
If θ ≥ θ∗ and IH1 < I∗1 the first best is attained. At Date 0, B borrows par-
tially secured. At Date 1, B borrows secured in state H and does not borrow
in state L.
If θ ≥ θ∗ and IH1 ≥ I∗1 , the first best is not attained due to the collateral
rat race and the collateral overhang. At Date 0, B borrows secured with face
value I0. At Date 1, B does not borrow in state H or state L.
The third case, where a collateral overhang arises, provides the foundation of DGP’s
contribution, as detailed in their abstract: “Creditors thus require collateral for protec-
tion against possible dilution by collateralized debt. There is a collateral rat race. But
collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets constraining future borrowing and
investment. There is a collateral overhang. Our results suggest that policies aimed at in-
creasing the supply of collateral can backfire, triggering an inefficient collateral rat race.”
While such statements throughout the paper emphasize the inefficiency of increasing
pledgeability, DGP’s Proposition 1 proposes a weaker notion of a paradox: “If θ < θ∗, C0
[the date-0 creditor] lends unsecured and the first best is attained; [...] if θ ≥ θ∗ C0 does
not lend unsecured.” There are two important points to make about this result. First,
when θ ≥ θ∗, secured lending may well implement the first best; when this is so, higher
pledgeability of cash flows does not hurt the firm and is irrelevant. Second, when θ < θ∗,
creditors do not need to lend unsecured: a continuum of partially-secured loans can imple-
ment the same equilibrium outcome—i.e., the first best. To highlight this point, we show
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that regardless of the degree of pledgeability θ, the same partially unsecured debt con-
tract can implement the first best—whenever it can be attained. Adopting this alternative
implementation, we rewrite Corollary 2 in terms of θˆ =
IH1 −IL1
XH1 −XL1
rather than θ∗ and I∗1 :
Corollary 2 (content restated). The equilibrium outcome is as follows.
If θ ≤ θˆ, then the date-0 creditor C0 lends fully secured and there is no
investment at date 1, regardless of whether the state is high or low.
If θ > θˆ, then C0 lends partially secured, with collateral σ set such that
θ(1− σ)X0 = IH1 − θXH1 . B borrows (secured) at date 1 in state H and does
not borrow in state L, so the first best attains.
Proof. Rewrite A7 as IH1 ≥ IL1 + θ(XH1 −XL1 ), and rewrite A5 as IH1 < θ(X0 + XH1 ). It
follows that, A7 can hold only if θ(X0 + X
H
1 ) > I
L
1 + θ(X
H
1 − XL1 ). Rewriting this as
θ >
IL1
X0+XL1
= θ∗, it is clear that A6 always holds. As a result, the case where θ ≥ θ∗
and IH1 ≥ I∗1 corresponds to θ ≤ θˆ. Next, note that a partially-secured debt contract
with collateral σ set to equate θ(1− σ)X0 = IH1 − θXH1 always implements the first best,
when θ < θˆ. This contract enables the financing of the good project, as the good project
requires exactly θ(1 − σ)X0, which is the remaining collateral from the date 0 project.
Moreover, the contract prevents the financing of the bad project at date 1, as the bad
project requires IL1 − θXL1 > IH1 − θXH1 = θ(1− σ)X0, where the first inequality follows
from the fact that IL1 − θXL1 > IH1 − θXH1 ⇐⇒ θ > θˆ. It follows from A1 that a date 0
lender breaks even under such a contract, establishing the equivalence argument.
This restatement of Corollary 2 based on Lemma 1 and A7′ clarifies that borrowers
never realize a gain from being able to lend unsecured in DGP’s framework.
For a paradox to arise in which increased pledgeability of cash flows results in an in-
efficient collateral rat race, there must be a firm for which there is a low θ < θ∗ at which
the first best is implemented, while at a higher θ′ ≥ θ∗ it is not. Theorem 1 establishes
that, in DGP’s framework, this is impossible: greater pledgeability can only improve real
investment efficiency, thereby helping borrowing firms.
Theorem 1. There is no ‘paradox’: firm value weakly increases with pledgeability θ.
1. If θ∗ ≥ θ¯, then the first best is implemented for every θ;
2. If θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ¯), then θ > θˆ for all θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), so the first best always obtains;
3. If θ∗ ≤ θ, then there are three sub-cases:
(a) If θˆ ≤ θ, then the first best is implemented for every θ;
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(b) If θˆ ≥ θ¯, then the first best is never implemented for any θ;
(c) If θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯), the first best is not implemented for θ ≤ θˆ, while it is for θ > θˆ.
Proof. Case 1. Follows from Corollary 2 (DGP): if θ∗ ≥ θ¯, then A6 is violated for all θ.
Case 2. Rewrite A7 as: IH1 − θXH1 > IL1 − θXL1 . If θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ¯), there must exist some
degree of pledgeability θ ∈ (θ, θ∗). From A6, θ < θ∗ if and only if θ < IL1
X0+XL1
. Because
X0 +X
L
1 > 0, we can rewrite this inequality as I
L
1 − θXL1 > θX0. Moreover, A5′ requires
θ >
IH1
X0+XH1
, which we rewrite as θX0 > I
H
1 − θXH1 . Combining the two inequalities yields
IL1 − θXL1 > θX0 > IH1 − θXH1 , which contradicts A7. Finally, if A7 is violated for θ < θ∗,
then it follows that it is also violated for every θ′ > θ∗, concluding the proof for Case (2).
Case 3a. Follows from Corollary 2 (DGP): if θˆ ≤ θ, A7 is violated ∀ θ.
Case 3b. Follows from Corollary 2 (DGP): if θˆ ≥ θ¯ and θ∗ ≤ θ, A6 and A7 hold ∀ θ.
Case 3c. Follows from the fact that when θˆ is interior and θ∗ ≤ θ, then A6 and A7 jointly
hold for a low θ ≤ θˆ (in which case we do not get first-best), while A7 is violated for
every θ > θˆ (in which case we get first-best).
Theorem 1 shows that one cannot make a firm better off by reducing the pledgeability
θ of its cash flows. The key condition used in the proof is A5, which states that there is
enough pledgeable cash in the high state at date 1 to invest in the positive NPV project
if date-0 creditors lend unsecured. The proof establishes that if the threshold θ∗ satis-
fies conditions A1-A5 (i.e., if θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ¯)), then it is not possible for A7 to hold. Thus,
θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ¯) is incompatible with the final case in Corollary 2, where greater pledgeability
can possibly hurt a firm. Relaxing A5 would not change the result. If θ is so low that A5
does not hold, then it would be impossible to finance the positive NPV project regard-
less of the date 0 contract, rendering the problem uninteresting. Moreover, increasing
pledgeability to a level that satisfies A5 could only make the firm better off.
Graphical argument and generalization. We now show that Theorem 1 is driven by
the fundamental economic forces of the model, and that it extends beyond DGP’s setting.
To this end, we present a graphical proof of Theorem 1, which uses the representation of
the problem in Figure 1. Define the collateral-gap in state s to be: CGs := Is1 − θXs1 , for
s ∈ {L,H}. This quantity describes the shortfall of collateral in state s at date 1. We
rewrite A3 as CGs > θX0 − I0, ∀s, while A5 reads CGH < θX0. As our proof to the
alternative statement of Corollary 2 shows, inefficiencies can arise only if IH1 ≥ I∗1 , which
we write as CGL ≤ CGH . In such a case, A6 always holds as θ ≥ θ∗ ⇐⇒ CGL ≤ θX0.
7
Figure 1: The Collateral-Gaps Argument
0 θX0 − I0 CGH θX0
a b c
Given DGP’s assumptions, CGL ∈ {a, b, c} in Figure 1. For a collateral overhang
to arise for some θ ∈ [0, 1], by Lemma 1 it must be that XH1 > XL1 . It follows that
∂CGH
∂θ
= −XH1 < ∂CG
L
∂θ
= −XL1 . That is, as pledgeability θ rises, CGH shifts to the
left (i.e., it falls) faster than CGL. Recall from DGP’s characterization that whenever
CGL ∈ {b, c}, we are at first-best. If CGL ∈ a, there is an inefficient collateral overhang—
no date-1 project is funded, regardless of its NPV. Because ∂CG
H
∂θ
< ∂CG
L
∂θ
, if we start
from CGL ∈ a and increase θ to transition to a different region, then the transition must
be to CGL ∈ b. In this case, we now implement the first best for such a θ. Moreover,
CGL ∈ b is an absorbing state: once we enter it for some θ, we stay there for every larger
θ. Thus, if CGL ∈ a, then efficiency can only increase as θ rises.
This graphical argument suggests that the beneficial role played by greater pledge-
ability of cash flows should extend beyond DGP’s setting. To show this, we relax the
structure of assumptions A1-A5, and allow for an arbitrary number of date-1 projects.
We now consider any finite number of date-1 states, indexed by s ∈ 1, 2, ..., N and
characterized by Is1 and X
s
1 . Without loss of generality, order states by NPV so that if
Xs1−Is1 > Xs′1 −Is′1 then s > s′. To start, we prove a slight generalization of our Lemma 1:
Lemma 3. Consider any two projects s and s′ with Xs1−Is1 > Xs′1 −Is′1 and CGs > CGs′
for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then Xs1 > Xs′1 and Is1 > Is′1 .
Proof. Rewrite Xs1 − Is1 > Xs′1 − Is′1 as Is′1 − Is1 > Xs′1 −Xs1 , and rewrite CGs > CGs′ as
Is
′
1 − Is1 < θ(Xs′1 −Xs1). The two inequalities jointly hold only if Xs′1 −Xs1 < θ(Xs′1 −Xs1).
Since θ ∈ [0, 1], both sides of this inequality must be negative, which implies that
Xs
′
1 < X
s
1 . This and CG
s > CGs
′
further imply that Is
′
1 < I
s
1 .
We now generalize Theorem 1 to show that pledgeability can never hurt a firm in any
N−state setting, regardless of whether assumptions A1-A5 hold or not.
Theorem 2. In our N−state setting, firm value weakly increases with pledgeability θ.
Proof. For greater pledgeability of cash flows to reduce the efficiency of the equilibrium
allocation, there must exist at least one pair of states s > s′ and pledgeability levels
θ > θ′ such that: (1) CGs(θ) > CGs
′
(θ), and (2) CGs(θ′) < CGs
′
(θ′). From Lemma 3,
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for (2) to hold for some θ and s > s′, we must have Xs1 > X
s′
1 . First, CG
s(θ) > CGs
′
(θ)
holds if and only if Is1 − Is′1 > θ(Xs1 −Xs′1 ). Second, CGs(θ′) < CGs′(θ′) holds if and only
if Is1 − Is′1 < θ′(Xs1 −Xs′1 ). The conditions jointly hold only if θ′ > θ, a contradiction.
Investment at date 1 as an ‘excuse to dilute’. In DGP’s setting, the possibility of
dilution is tightly linked to investment at date 1. In particular, a borrower is not allowed
to dilute date-0 creditors unless it invests in a new project.2 One may wonder whether
this assumption is critical in sustaining the beneficial role played by pledgeability. To see
that it is not needed, first note that if a borrower can freely dilute the date-0 creditors,
then lending at date 0 requires full collateralization. Thus, at date 1, the borrower has
access to collateral of θX0−I0. By A3, Is1−θXs1 > θX0−I0 > 0, so there is never enough
collateral left to finance a project at date one. Beyond A3, the borrower never has an in-
centive to finance negative NPV projects when he is free to dilute, as the option of diluting
without ‘burning cash’ is always more desirable. Moreover, increasing θ so that A3 ceases
to hold makes the borrower better off, enabling the financing of positive NPV projects.
Optimal non-state-contingent contracts. Thus far, we have restricted attention to
the family of debt contracts considered by DGP. However, DGP note that state-contingent
collateralization—i.e., making the fraction of secured output σ a function of the state s—
can always implement the first best: “We have assumed away state-contingent collateral-
ization. Were it possible, it could circumvent the inefficiencies arising in our analysis.”
We conclude by establishing that state-contingent collateral is not needed to imple-
ment the first best. Lemma 1 showed that inefficiencies arise only when XH1 > X
L
1 and
IH1 > I
L
1 . This strict difference in investment levels across states, which is needed to
generate inefficiencies, gives the borrower a simple, non-state-contingent instrument to
implement the first best. Proposition 1 shows that reducing collateral demands when the
firm’s rate of investment is sufficiently high at date 1 always implements the first best.
Proposition 1. Under A1-A7, the first best can be implemented by borrowing (partially)
secured at date 0, with a collateral discount if B invests more than Iˆ ∈ [IL1 , IH1 ) at date
1. For instance, B can issue debt with face value D0 and collateral rate σ0(I1) at date 0,
where σ0(I1) = 1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ, σ0(I1) = 0 if I1 > Iˆ, for Iˆ ∈ [IL1 , IH1 ).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
2We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Pledgeability vs. Collateralizability
In Section 3.2, DGP use the term ‘collateralizability’ to describe a property of all pledge-
able cash flows, as is standard in the literature. Specifically, creditors can secure as
collateral any fraction σ ∈ [0, 1] of the pledgeable cash flows θX. Later, in Section 4.7,
DGP introduce a distinction between ‘pledgeable’ and ‘collateralizable’ assets, arguing
that some pledgeable assets might not be usable as collateral. They redefine collateral-
izable assets as a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of the pledgeable cash flows θX that can be used
as collateral—i.e., only for these assets can property rights be assigned to an individual
creditor. In contrast to pledgeable cash flows, which are a given fraction θ of the firm’s
cash flows, collateralizable assets are introduced with a time-specific index µt.
In their Proposition 4, DGP assume that p is small ‘enough’ and state that ‘If µ1 > µ
∗
1,
B does not invest at Date 0 or Date 1’, where the threshold µ∗1 solves
(1 + µ∗1)θX
L
1 + (1− µ0)θX0 = 2IL1 . (2)
The result suggests that high collateralizability may hurt a firm. One might wonder
whether Proposition 4 delivers an alternative ‘paradox of collateralizability’. We now
clarify that this is not so. To illustrate, suppose that, like pledgeability θ, the frac-
tion of collateralizable assets is independent of the specific project, so that µt = µ for
all t. If XL1 > X0, then using equation (2), the condition µ > µ
∗
1 can be written as
µ ≥ 2IL1 −θ(X0+XL1 )
θ(XL1 −X0)
. There exists some µ such that µ > µ∗1 only if
2IL1 −θ(X0+XL1 )
θ(XL1 −X0)
< 1, or,
equivalently, if θXL1 > I
L
1 . However, this violates A2, which requires the bad project to
have a negative NPV. Similarly, if XL1 = X0, re-arranging the condition again yields that
µ > µ∗1 if and only if 0 > I
L
1 − θXL1 , violating A2.
The remaining case of XL1 < X0 is more interesting. The condition µ > µ
∗
1 can be
written as: µ <
θ(X0+XL1 )−2IL1
θ(X0−XL1 )
, revealing that when µ1 = µ0, contrary to what a ‘paradox
of collateralizability’ would require, the inefficient date-0 under-investment detailed in
Proposition 4 arises only when collateralizability is sufficiently low. To see the intuition,
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consider equation (11) in DGP with σ0 = µ0 = µ1 = µ: (1 + µ)θX
L
1 + (1− µ)θX0 ≥ 2IL1 .
This equation details the conditions under which B would borrow at date 1 with a bad
project. When µ increases, the right-hand side does not change. However, the derivative
of the left-hand side with respect to µ is θ(XL1 −X0) < 0. Thus, increasing µ makes this
condition harder to satisfy. As a result, when collateralizability is not project-specific,
there is no paradox, and increasing µ is beneficial.3 Proposition 4 effectively says that
a disproportionally higher collateralizability of the negative NPV date-1 project, relative
to the positive NPV date-0 project, can encumber a firm’s assets. This unsurprising re-
sult extends immediately to Corollary 3, where DGP take the analogous derivative with
respect to µ1, leaving µ0 fixed.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose B offers a contract (D0, σ0(I1)) at date 0, where σ0(I1) = 1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ, σ0(I1) = 0
otherwise, and Iˆ ∈ [IL1 , IH1 ). For simplicity, we use DGP’s formulation that t = 0 credi-
tors only secure revenues from Project 0 as collateral. B cannot raise funds when s = L,
because θXL1 < I
L
1 by A1 and A3. In contrast, B can borrow when s = H only if
θ(X0 +X
H
1 ) ≥ IH1 , which holds by A5. When s = H, creditors are willing to lend only if
IH1 ≤ D1. Optimization by B means that this constraint binds, i.e., D∗1 = IH1 . Conjecture
that the date 0 face value is: D∗0 :=
I0+pIH1 −pθ(X0+XH1 )
1−p . First, note that D0 > 0 if and
only if I0 + pI
H
1 > pθ(X0 +X
H
1 ). But D0 > 0 then follows since I0 + pI
H
1 > pI0 + pI
H
1 >
pθ(X0 +X
H
1 ), where the last inequality follows from A3. Moreover, D0 ≤ θX0 if and only
if pθXH1 +θX0 ≥ I0+pIH1 . From A1, I0 < (1−p)θX0. Thus, I0+pIH1 < (1−p)θX0+pIH1 .
Moreover, pθXH1 +θX0 ≥ (1−p)θX0 +pIH1 if and only if θ(X0 +XH1 ) ≥ IH1 , which always
holds by A5. As a result, we conclude that D0 ∈ (0, θX0]. It remains to check that such a
D0 makes the participation constraint for the t = 0 creditors just bind, as required by op-
timality. In the low state, because there is no investment at date 1, cash flow is θX0 ≥ D0.
In the high state, cash flow is θ(X0 + X
H
1 ), but I
H
1 will go to date-1 creditors (who are
secured). Thus, date-0 creditors get min{θ(X0 + XH1 ) − IH1 , D0}. The amount of credit
available is enough to cover the face value of debt if and only if θ(X0 +X
H
1 )− IH1 ≥ D0,
or equivalently if and only if θ(X0 +X
H
1 ) ≥ I0 + IH1 . However, by A3, this condition is al-
ways violated. Thus, date-0 creditors are diluted in the high state, and their participation
constraint reads I0 ≤ p(θ(X0 +XH1 )− IH1 ) + (1− p)D0, which just binds at D∗0. 
3Note that, like DGP, we are not explicitly considering the role played by the positive NPV date-1
project. For simplicity, one can think that there isn’t one or, as DGP put it, that ‘p is not too large’.
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